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ABSTRACT 
Green payment programs, where the government pays farmers directly for environmental 
benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits 
by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper presents a voluntary 
green payment program using the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information. The 
information asymmetry arises because government knows only the distribution of individual fanners· 
production situations, rather than farm-specific information. The program is applied to irrigated corn 
production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a nonpoint source of pollution. We 
demonstrate empirically that a green payment program can increase farm income, decrease pollution, and 
increase the net social value of corn production relative to current deficiency payment programs. 
OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A VOLUNTARY GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAM 
UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Environmental benefits offered by U.S. farmers have been purchased primarily by making 
eligibility for subsidies conditional on compliance \Vith conservation practices. To remain eligible for 
subsidies. farmers cannot drain wetlands or till previously untilled land. and they must adopt and follow 
conservation measures that reduce soil erosion. The private cost of providing these environmental 
benefits currently is less than the subsidies, so there are continued high participation rates in U.S. farm 
c1•mmodity programs. HO\vever, if recent trends of reduced agricultural subsidies continue. the costs of 
meeting environmental restrictions will eventually be greater than the subsidies and government will 
need to find a new mechanism to purchase environmental benefits from farmers. 
One proposal is to pay farmers directly for the environmental benefits they provide. Such 
proposals have been called "green payment" or "environmental stewardship" programs. The objective of 
this study is to develop a green payment program that is voluntary and incentive compatible. This \York 
applies the principles of mechanism design developed by Mirrlees ( 1971 ); Dasgupta, Hammond. and 
Mask in ( 1979); Myerson (1979); Harris and Townsend ( 1981 ); Baron and Myerson ( 1982); Guesnem: 
and Laffont ( 1984); and Chambers ( 1989). Previous applications to agricultural policy analysis include 
Lewis. Feenstra, and Ware ( 1989), who analyzed the reorganization of subsidized industries under 
asymmetric information. and Chambers ( 1992), who examined the motivations underlying the choice 0f 
agricultural policy mechanisms. 
This study extends previous analyses by explicitly considering the environmental consequences 
of agricultural production. The mechanism design approach recognizes that the consequences of policy 
can be fully characterized through outcomes. By focusing on outcomes, rather than on an inevitably 
arbitrary set of program parameters such as target prices and loan rates, this approach does not, a priori, 
limit the range ofpolicy instruments (Chambers 1992). Thus, mechanism design is an ideal approach for 
analysis of farm policy reform. 
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The motivation for developing a green payment program is to increase the efficiency with which 
farmer-supplied environmental benefits are purchased and to have an alternative to current policy ready 
to implement if farm subsidies continue to decline. Efficiency increases should result from direct, 
targeted payments for high-value environmental amenities. And, as Kuch ( 1994) pomts out tighter 
federal budgets are not likely to support both current commodity programs and programs to offset their 
detrimental environmental effects. 
The Model 
This green payment program directs payments to farmers according to their choices of 
production practices. Payments arc made in exchange for adopting environmentally friendly farming 
practices. Under the program, the public signals its demand for crops through the commodity markets, 
and the government signals the public's demand for farm-produced environmental goods and services 
through green payments. 
The program is modeled as a mechanism design problem. The government presents a poltcy 
menu that consists oftwo doubles: one is the type of production practices allowed (e.g., input use and 
tillage practices). and the other is the level of government payments. The menu may specify as many 
combinations as there are distinct resource settings. Farmers can choose any combination or none ot 
them So, partictpation is kept voluntary. In developing the green payment program. the asymmetry of 
information bet\veen the government and producers plays an integral role in program design. We assume 
that although the government knows all possible resource settings, it cannot identify each individual 
farmer's resource setting. i\s Chambers ( 1992) points out even if the government can identify 
Individual fanners' resource settings. political pressures may preclude using these differences as the 
overt basis for policy formulation. Given this information asymmetry, farmers may have an incentive to 
misrepresent their resource settings to obtain favorable combinations of production practices and 
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payments The program is designed to induce farmers to report their true resource settings Thus, the 
program IS second-best because of this constraint 
Producers of an agricultural commodity are differentiated by their resource endowment For 
simplicity. assume that there are tv,o groups of producers. The analysis can be extended 111 a 
straightforward manner toN groups of producers. Producers in group I have lower quality lands than 
producers in group 2. That is, given a level, producers in group I always have lower yields than 
producers in group 2. Assume that the government knows that there are two groups of producers but it 
cannot Identify to which group an individual producer belongs. Furthermore assume that each producer 
kn(l\\ s his or her own group. Thus information is asymmetric between the government and farmers. 
Let x represent input levels with measuring x, 0 indicating the current production practices on 
lilrm type i. The corresponding net return end pollution level, rri (x, 0 ) and z, ( x, 0 ). are 
rr, (x,n) = pf, (xi 0 ) -- wx, 0 • ( I ) 
(=:) 
\Vhere ( (-) and g, (-) are the production and pollution functions for producers in group 1. and p and \V are 
the output and input prices. Let x1c denote the production practices that maximize the social value of 
production Ill type i farms That is, x,e is defined by 
\\here tIS the social cost per unit of pollution. If these production practices are adopted, income for 
producers ll1 group i will ben, (x," ). The resulting pollution level is z, (x,c ). 
Under full information. a regulation that directs type i farms to use production practice x," 
would be socially optimaL But often the government does not have enough farm-level information to 
achieve this degree of regulation. Relying on farmers to report their true resource base may cause 
Incentive compatability problems as farmers attempt to maximize the sum of government and market 
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returns counter to governments' intention to maximize the sum of private and public gains. In addition. 
direct regulation runs counter to the tradition (of voluntary) farm programs. 
Under a voluntary green payment program with asymmetric information, the government presents 
farmers with a policy menu that consists of two doubles ( x,, s,) (I = I, 2). where x, is the production 
practices intended for farm type i. and s, is the per acre payment from the government if x, is chosen The 
green payment program should be designed so that producers have no incentive to choose the option 
mtcnded for the other group. Specifically, (x, ,s,) must be the optimal choice for producers in group i. 
I his constraint is often referred to as selj~selection or incentive compatihili(v constraint in the mechanism 
design literature. A policy menu (x,, si) (i = L2) is self-selecting if 
rc 1(x1)+s- ~rc 1 (xi)+s2 , 
rc 2 (x 2 )+s2 ~rc 2 (x 1 )+s1 . 
(4) 
(5) 
The self-selection constraints require that producers of each group must prefer the policy option intended 
ror them to the option intended for the other group. 
Inequalities (4) and (5) imply that 
1! I (X:) - 1! I (X 1) :e: 1! c (X 2) - 1! 2 (X 1 ), or 
f 1 (X:' ) - f 1 (X 1 ) :e: f 2 (X:' ) -- f 2 (X 1 ) . 
Thus. if ()fl I ox :e: of:' I 8x for all XI :e: X :e: x2' then x2 ~XI' and if ofl I ox~ of2 I ex for all 
(6) 
(7) 
x 1 <; x :e: x, . then x 2 :e: x 1 • That is, producers with a larger marginal product must be allowed to use 
more inputs. When both (6) and (7) bind, then f 1 (x 2 ) -- f 1 (x 1) = f 2 (x:>)- f 2 (x 1). Thus, unless 
'-: 1 = x~. only one self-selection constraint can bind and at least one ofthe groups prefers its policy option 
to the one intended for the other group. In this case. the inequalities in (6) and (7) hold strictly. 
To induce producers to participate, the green payment program must satisfY individual rationality 
constraints Farmers cannot be worse off participating than if they choose not to participate: 
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(8) 
(9) 
A green payment program is feasible if it satisfies equations ( 4), (5), (8), and (9). When the government 
uses a feasible program, fanners voluntarily choose the policy option intended for them 
The government's problem is to find a feasible program that maximizes its objective function 
Assume that the government wishes to maximize social surplus from agricultural production. Given the 
poI icv menu (x, , s, ) (i = L2) , social value of production for farm type i. co, (xi ). IS 
(I 0) 
and ~ocial surplus from production is 
( 1 I) 
\\here /, is the marginal social cost of raising (tax revenue to support) the government payment. The 
government's problem can be formally stated as 
2 
Max IA,[rc,(x,)-tgJx,)·-t,s,J, (I 2) 
x,,s, 
s.t. (4), (5), (8), (9) 
I \ . I I . h -th f w 1cre 1 , IS t 1e tota acreage m t e 1 type arms. 
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for the maximization problem are as follows: 
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(20) 
where ~t; ~ 0 (j= I. 2, 3, 4) are the Lagrange multipliers for the four constraints in ( 12) The solution to 
the government's problem, CX: ,s~) (i=l, 2), sattsfies equations (13) to (20). If X:< x, 0 fori =I, 2. then 
both s 1 and s 2 must be positive to satisfy the individual rationality constraints. Equations ( 15) and ( 16) 
indicate that if both s 1 and s 2 are positive then only the following cases are possible: ( 1) ~t 1 = ~t 2 = 0. 
,Ll, = !J\ 1 • ~1 4 = lc( A1 + A2 ): ( 4) only ~t 1 = 0: and ( 5) only ~ 2 = 0. These cases imply that at least 
two of the four constraints are binding. Also, when X: :f. x;, at least one individual rationality 
constraint must be binding because only one self-section constraint can bind. 
In case 1, both individual rationality constraints are binding because ~t 1 > 0 and ~t 1 > 0. As a 
resu 1t. both groups of producers are indiffe:-ent between the green payment program and no program 
Substituting ~t, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) into (15) and (16) gives 
l 
TC; (x1)- -- g;(x1) = 0. 1 + ), 
l 
TC; (x7 )--- g~ (x,) = 0. 
.. - 1+/c - -
(21) 
(22) 
Equations (21) and (22) indicate that opportunity costs of government spending decrease the importance 
of externaltty costs in determining optimal input use. This result reflects the trade-off between the 
externality costs of pollution and the costs of raising government payments. The more input use is 
allowed. the larger the externality costs will be. but the social costs to raise government payments are 
. 
smaller because fewer payments are needed. Thus, if),> 0, x,c < x, . Equations (21) and (22) also 
mdicate as long as t > 0, x, < x, 0 . 
In case 2. equations (15) and (16) can be simplified to 
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I( ) t I.) A(A2/AI) I ( 
111 xl -1+/,(l+A:/AI)gl(xl -l+A-(l+A:/AI)112(xl)= ), (23) 
11 ~ (Xo)- - 1- g~ (X,)= 0. 
- • 1 + ), - - (24) 
Equation (24) indicates that optimal production practices for group 2 are the same as in case I 
However, because ~L 2 > 0, the self-selection constraint for producers in group 2 must be binding. As a 
result. production practices for producers in group 1 are further restricted. Otherwise, producers in t'-roup 
2 would prefer the policy option intended for producers in group 1. Because only the individual 
rationality constraint for group 1 is binding, producers in group 2 are better off than without any farm 
programs. vvhile producers in group 1 are indifferent between participating in the program and having no 
program at all. Case 3 is symmetric to case 2. 
In cases (4) and (5), both individual rationality constraints bind. Thus, all producers are 
mdifferent between participating in the program and having no program at all As in previous cases. it 
can be shown that if A 7:- 0, X: > X;c (i = I, 2). When ), = 0. cases 4 and 5 arc impossible because 
equations ( 15) to (20) imply that when only ~L 1 = 0, ( x;. s;) = ( x 20 .0). and when only ~L 2 = 0 _ 
eX: .s;) = (x 10 ,0) However, x 20 docs not satisfy (16) when only ~ 1 = 0, and x 10 does not satisf\ 
( 15) when only ~ 2 = 0 _ Intuitively, when government spending does not cause efficiency loss, the net 
social surplus cannot be maximized at (x 10 ,0) or (x 20 .0) because net social surplus will be increased 
when payments are made in exchange for environmentally friendly practices. 
Equations (21) to (24) indicate that if "A= 0. then x: = X;c fori =1, 2. If Jc = 0 and x, 7:- x,c 
(i =I. 2). then both self-selection constraints must be binding because when any one ofthe self-selection 
constraints is not binding, it falls into one of the first three cases discussed above. Thus, if /, = 0 and 
X: 7:- x," (i =1. 2). x; = x; = x' and s; = s; = s', where x' is defined by 
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These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If lc :t 0, then x,e::; x: ::; x, 0 fori= I, 2. The inequalities strictly hold when t :t 0. If 
). = 0, then the following policy is optimal in the sense that it satisfies the incentive compatibility and 
Individual rationality constraints and maximizes social surplus from agricultural production: 
participation at aiL where s 1 and s2 arc selected to satisfy 
nl(x2e)-nl(xiJ:::::si-s2 :::::n2(x2e)-n2(xk) 
n,(xic)+si 2n 2 (x, 0 ) fori= L2. 
h ( lthcrwise, farmers are given two options: ( x', s') or no participation, where x is defined by 
(25) 
When f 1 ( x lc)- f 1 (X Ie) < f2 ( x lc) - f 2 ( x Ic), vve can always choose s 1 and S 1 close and large 
enough so that they satisfy (25). Since the first set of inequalities in (25) implies incentive compatibilitv, 
and the second implies individual rationality, the socially optimal level of input use can be implemented 
In this case, producers in group i will choose (x"., s,) for their own interest, and the stewardship 
program becomes a first-best policy. When fi (x 2c)- f 1 (X 1c) >, f 2 (x 2e)- f 2 (X 1c), there does not 
exist s 1 and s, such that ( x le, s 1 ) and (x 2e, s 2 ) satisfy the self-selection constraints. 
If x> > x Jc = 0, the optimal policy vvould be to idle the land on type 1 farms. Because 
enrolls the least expensive land first would satisfy incentive compatibility and would therefore result in 
correct land being enrolled. However, if x 1c > x 2c = 0, the socially optimal policy would be to idle the 
retirement program like CRP that enrolls the least expensive land first will not be incentive compatible 
and, therefore, will give farmers some incentive to misrepresent their environmental attributes. In fact, 
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without appropriate procedures to establish the eligibility for participation, such programs would end up 
enrolling lands on type I f~1rms. 
An Empirical Example 
Implementing the green payment program requires extensive information about resource-specific 
production functions for crops and pollution, the marginal cost of pollution, and the marginal social cost 
of taxes In this empirical example, we use technical information on corn production (and nitrogen 
pollution) in the Oklahoma Panhandle reported by Wu, Mapp, and Bernardo ( 1994) We construct green 
payment contracts for four combinations of /c and t The study region IS generally characterized by 
tipland plains and a semiarid climate. Annual precipitation is about 19 inches. Richfield clay loam. 
! llysses clay loam. Dalhart fine sandy loam, and Dalhart loamy fine sands are the four principal cropland 
soil types in the region (Bernardo et al. 1993). Because of data limitations, we only consider nitrogen 
water pollution 111 designing the stewardship programs. A comprehensive analysis should consider other 
environmental indicators (e.g. soil erosion) and pollutants (e.g. pesticides) as well. In addition, this 
analysis ignores enforcement issues and assumes that farmers will actually honor their green payment 
programs and change their input use accordingly 
Corn accounts for about 2 percent of cropland in this region but more than 10 percent of nitrogen 
loss in runoff and leaching. According to the 1987 National Resources Inventory (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture). about 71 percent of corn is grown on clay loam soil and 29 percent on fine sandy loam soil. 
Because all corn acres are irrigated, no corn is grown on loamy fine sand. Clay loam soil is more 
suitable to corn production and less vulnerable to nitrogen runoff and leaching than fine sandy loam soil 
(Bernardo et al. 1993: Petr and Bremer 1976). Thus, corn producers are grouped into two categories: 
one \Vith clay loam soil and the other with fine sandy loam soil. 
10 
Richfield clay loam and Dalhart fine sandy loam are selected to represent clay loam and fine 
sandy loam soiL Production and pollution functions for corn on these two soil types are taken from Wu, 
~1app, and Bernardo ( 1994) as are estimates of water application costs. nitrogen price, irrigation fixed 
costs. and costs for all other fixed and variable costs for the study region. The target price. deficiency 
payment. and program yield for corn in 1994 are from F APRI 1994. Using this information, we estimate 
input usc. yields. farm income. nitrogen runoff and leaching, government payments. and net social 
~urplus for each type of farm under current commodity programs. The results are reported in columns 2 
tu c\ of Table 1. Although all corn on fine sandy loam soil is irrigated using sprinkler systems. about 35 
percent of corn on clay loam soil is irrigated using furrow systems. Therefore. results are reported for 
hoth sprinkle and furrow irrigation on clay loam soil. 
Results under a first-best policy are reported in columns 5 to 8. These results are derived under 
the assumptions that government price supports are eliminated and the pollution externalities arc 
internalized. These results are estimated for t\vo different values of the social costs of pollution (i.e .. 
t = S5 and t = $1 0). Because we have no information about the possible range oft the results only c;hcm. 
hmv sensitive the net social surplus is to changes in social costs of pollution. 
The stewardship program results developed here are reported in columns 9 through 16 and arc 
estimated for four combinations of A and t. In the first two combinations, A= 0 is assumed. Alston and 
I lurd ( 1990). in a paper on public economics and optimal taxation, suggest that the marginal efficienc; 
loss of a dollar of U.S. federal spending is likely between $0.20 and $0.50 so A= 0.35 is assumed. 
Net social surplus under current commodity programs is lower than the optimal level on both soil 
type" The difference is the net social loss from t\VO factors. First, government spending on farm 
programs directly· causes efficiency loss because the opportunity cost of one dollar of government 
spending is likely to be greater than $1. Second, current farm programs do not provide an incentive for 
producers to consider environmental performance in their production decisions. The public good nature 
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of environmental performance has created a marked failure that results in excessive input usc and 
overproduction and pollution. For example, when t = $5, producers use 31 percent more of water and 13 
percent more of nitrogen than the efficient levels on fine sandy loam soil. As a result, corn yield is 5.8 
percent higher than the efficient level, and nitrogen losses per acre are 1.5 pounds more than the efficient 
level. Net social loss increases as social costs of pollution and efficiency losses of government spending 
increase. For example, vvhen t = $5 and A= 0. net social losses are $2.6 per acre on fine sandy loam soil. 
As t increases to $10, net social loss increases to $24 per acre. Net social loss reaches $101 per acre 
when t = $1 0 and A = $0.3 5. Outcomes under the stcwardsh ip program are closer to efficient outcomes 
on clay loam soil than on fine sandy loam soil because clay loam soil is much less vulnerable to nitrogen 
loss 
When A = 0, the stewardship program becomes a first-best policy because 
f 1 ( x :'e) -- f 1 (x 1_,) < f2 (x 2e)- f 2 (x 1c) is satisfied for both t = $5 and t = $10. For example, when 
t = $10. a policy menu, (irrigation system, nitrogen use, irrigation level, payments)= (no irrigation. 0. 0, 
51.7) or (sprinkler, 197, 16.5, 0.5), will induce both producer groups to choose the efficient input levels. 
Producers \vith fine sandy loam soil will be \villing to idle their land in exchange for a payment of $5 I 70 
per acre from the government. Ifthey choose (sprinkler, 197, 16.7, 0.5), the bundle intended for 
producers with clay loam soil, their expected net return would be $49 per acre. If they do not participate 
in government programs, their expected net return would be $51.60 per acre. Producers with fine sandy 
loam soil benefit from idling their land and accepting the government payment. Similarly, it can be 
shown that producers with clay loam soil will voluntarily reduce their nitrogen use to 197 pounds and 
water use to 16.5 inches and accept a payment of $0.50 per acre. 
As predicted by the theoretical modeL when A= 0.35, producers under the stewardship program 
wi II use fewer inputs than under current commodity programs but more inputs than the efficient levels. 
For example. when t = $5, producers will apply 17.7 inches of water and 201 pounds of nitrogen per acre 
12 
on Dalhart fine sandy soiL which arc 11.5 and 5.6 percent less than under current commodity programs 
and 13.6 and 6.0 percent more than the efficient levels. 
Although net social surplus is negative ( -$1 3.9) on fine sandy loam soil when t = $10 and "A= 
0.35. it is still beneficial to let farmers with fine sandy loam soil produce Alternatively, the government 
vvould have to pay at least $51.60 per acre in order for these farmers to idle their land. which would 
cause an effie iency loss of $18. 1 0 per acre. 
Comparing the status quo with outcomes under the green payment program shows that replacing 
current f~m11 programs with the green payment program will reduce government spending on farm 
programs. reduce nitrogen runoff and leaching, and increase net social surplus of agricultural production. 
\!though farm income under the green payment program is lower than under current commodity 
programs. it is at least as high as without any government program. Adding a farm income constramt to 
the design of the stewardship program would increase government payments and reduce program 
efficiency. but not eliminate all the advantages of the green payment program over current commodity 
programs. The design of the green payment program takes into account externality costs of agricultural 
production. For example, when t = $5 and A= $0.35, a stewardship program guaranteeing that both 
types of fanners are as well off as under the current commodity program will increase net social surplus 
per acre by $0.80 on fine sandy loam soil and $2.40 on clay soil. A green payment program that 
guarantees income for both types of farmers is at least 90 percent of current income will increase net 
~ocial surplus per acre by $5.70 on fine sandy loam soil and $6.30 on clay loam soil. In the second 
example. government payments will also be reduced by 18.5 percent on fine sandy loam soil and 12.6 
percent on clay loam soil. Thus, a green payment program can be designed to improve economic 
efficiency and environmental and fiscal performance while simultaneously assisting producers. 
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Concluding Remarks 
L:ndcr the green payment program, payments are made in exchange for reduced input usc that 
may cause environmental damage. The program is voluntary and self-selecting. The stewardship 
program is second-best because of these constraints. 
We illustrate the application of our approach by designing a stewardship corn program for the 
Oklahoma Panhandle. Results indicate that replacing current farm programs with the stewardship 
program wi II reduce government spending on farm programs, improve environmental performance. and 
1ncrease net social surplus from corn production. The larger the social cost of pollution and efficiency 
lo'>s of government spending, the larger the improvements in economic efficiency and environmental and 
tlscal performance. 
i\chicving better environmental and fiscal performance and economic efficiency under the 
-;tcwardship program may come at the expense of other objectives of farm programs. For example, the 
stability of fann commodity prices. farm income. and retail food prices may increase without includmg 
other policy instruments. Such a program could also significantly redistribute farm program payment.;; 
because they would no longer be directly tied to production. In addition, this analysis assumes that 
t~'1nners will actually honor their green payment programs and use specified production practices 
accordingly. In practice, there is an enforcement issue. Production practices such as irrigation and 
tillage that arc observable can be enforced in the same way the Conservation Compliance Program is 
enforced However, without introducing appropriate mechanisms, chemical use may not be monitored. 
Table l. A Comparison of Outcomes Under the Current, First-Best, and Green Corn Programs for the Oklahoma Panhandle 
The Status Quo The Effietcnt Outcomes A Stcwardshtp Pro~Zram ()., =0) A Stewardship Program ()., =0.35) 
Y:tnablcs Furrow Sprinkler t=$5 t=SlO t=$5 t=SlO t=S5 t=$10 
Clay" Sandy" Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay 
Production Practices 
Nitrogen (lb/a) 224 213 204 189 200 0 197 189 200 0 197 201 201 159 198 
Water (in/a) 19.0 20.0 18.0 15.3 17.0 0 16.5 15.3 17.0 () 16.5 17.7 17.1 9.4 16.7 
liTigation Systemb Fur Spr Spr Spr Spr () Spr Spr Spr 0 Spr Spr Spr Spr Spr 
Yield (bu/a) 207 200 209 189 208 0 207 189 208 0 207 195 208 169 207 
Nitrogen Loss (lb/a) 
Runoff 14.78 4.39 2.53 4.53 2.50 0 2.49 4.53 2.50 0 2.49 4.59 2.51 3.22 2.49 
Leaching 0.95 3.17 0.30 1.52 0.26 0 0.23 1.52 0.26 () 0.23 2.34 0.27 0.00 0.24 
Net Return ($/a) 73.7 51.6 82.5 46.7 82.3 0 82.0 46.7 82.3 0 82.0 50.3 82.1 26.9 81.81 
Gov. Payments ($/a)c 48.9 45.5 49.8 0 0 0 () 5.0d 2.0d 51.7d 0.5d 1.3 1.4 24.7 0.7 
.!:.. 
Farm Income ($/a) 122.6 97.1 130.3 46.7 82.3 0 82.0 51.7 84.3 51.7 82.5 51.6 83.5 51.6 82.5 
Opp. Costs of Gov. Pay. 
A.=O 48.9 45.5 49.8 0 0 0 0 5.0 2.0 51.7 0.5 
A. =0.35 66.0 61.4 67.2 0 () 0 0 1.76 1.89 33.3 0.9 
Social Costs of Pollu. 
t=$5 78.7 37.8 14.2 30.3 13.8 0 13.6 30.3 13.8 34.7 13.9 
t=$10 157.3 75.6 28.3 60.5 27.6 0 27.2 0.0 27.2 32.2 27.1 
Net Social Surplus 
A =0, t=$5 -5.0 13.8 68.3 16.4 68.5 16.4 68.5 
A =0, t=$10 -83.6 -24.0 54.2 0 54.8 0.0 54.7 
A =0.35, t=$5 -22.1 -2.1 48.9 16.4 68.5 15.1 67.7 
A=0.35, t=$10 -100.7 -39.9 34.8 0 54.8 -13.9 54.5 
a Sandy=fine sandy loam soils, Clay=clay loam soils. 
b Spr=sprinkler systems, Fur=furrow systems. 
c A program yield of 105.2 bushels per acre and a deficiency payment of 50.48 per bushels arc used in calculating the government payments (FAPRI 1994). 
d When t = $5, any payment scheme that satisfies s1 ?: 4.9. s2 ?: 0.2 and s1 - s2 = 2.9 will he incentive compatible and will satisfy the individual rationality cDnstramts 
Therefore, such a scheme will induce producers to use the socially optimal input levels. Similarly, when t = $10, any payment scheme that satisfies s 1 ?: 51.6, s2 ?: 0.5 and 
49.6 :<:; s1 - s2 :<:; 82.0 will he optimal. The payment levels specified here mmimize government outlays. 
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